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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Do "TAX CONSULTANTS" PRACTICE LAW?
There has recently come from the Appellate Division of. the New
York Supreme Court, through the medium of the decision in Application
of New York County Lawyers Association,' as succinct a statement of the
doctrine juris consultis interpretatio juris2 as has yet been announced
by any court. In meaning, that statement is as certain and exact as the
doctrine of stare decisis; in operation, it should prove as lasting and
helpful. Without doubt, for New York, it answers the question posed
above.
The origin of that decision lay in the fact that a New York corpora-
tion, which had not shown any profit for three years and had not paid
its sales and compensating use taxes due the state, suddenly made so much
money that it was faced with the prospect of having to pay a large
federal income tax. The question arose as to whether the payment, in
the current year, of the past due sales and use taxes would support de-
duction by the taxpayer of the amount thereof from the current large
profit. The company's accountant, who was also a lawyer, advised against
any such deduction. It was then that the company called upon one Bercu,
a certified public accountant, and requested his advice. He was not asked
to audit any books or prepare any tax returns but was simply asked the
abstract question: Does the law permit the taking of this deduction in
the current year? He answered the question, charged the company for
his advice,3 and when the company did not pay he sued. Recovery was
denied on the ground that Bercu had engaged in the unauthorized prac-
tice of law. Thereafter, the New York County Lawyers Association ap-
plied to the court to punish Bercu for his contempt as well as to enjoin
against his unauthorized practice in the future. Although the initial
tribunal denied relief, substantially on the theory that the giving of tax
advice was proper tax accounting practice, the Appellate Division, by a
divided vote, imposed a fine and issued the injunction. The majority
declared that when an accountant passes on a question of law, apart from
auditing books or preparing tax returns, he is engaging in the unauthorized
practice of law.
1 Sub nom. In re Bercu, 273 App. Div. 524. 78 N. Y. S. (2d) 209 (1948), reversing
188 Misc. 406, 69 N. Y. S. (2d) 730 (1947). Glennon, J., dissented. It is understood
that the case is now pending before the New York Court of Appeals.
2 That maxim may be said to mean that interpretation of the law is the province
of lawyers.
3 What that advice was is immaterial to this discussion.
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Considering, as a matter of public benefit, whether accountants ought
to be entrusted to engage in the abstract interpretation of laws, attention
is first directed to differences in education and training between attorneys
and accountants. A survey shows that in at least forty states the general
educational requirement for the lawyer is a minimum of two years of
prelegal training at the college level as opposed to a maximum requirement
of only a high school education for the accountant. In over a fourth of
the American states, admission to the bar also demands a minimum of
three years of law school study, covering every branch of the law, as com-
pared to only two states which require any specialized college training for
the certified public accountant.4 Much more significant, however, is the
fact that the scope of the education and training of the great body of
self-styled "accountants" or "tax consultants" is absolutely unspecified
and uncontrolled. They are on their own and all is fish that falls in their
nets. To allow such persons, who have not made a study of the whole
body of the law, with its correlated system of statutes and decisions, to
interpret statutes would be as absurd as to permit persons who lack a study
of the whole human body to operate on the human anatomy.5
It must also be remembered that, in order to protect the public against
ill-considered interpretations of the law leading to wholesale litigation,
attorneys, made officers of the courts by the solemn judicial act of ad-
mission to the bar, are responsible directly for moral or professional mis-
conduct. No matter how fine the education and training of accountants
might grow to be, they still will not be, and cannot be, under the direct
disciplinary control of the courts. Except by enforcing liability for mal-
practice after the event, there is no way by which the courts can impose
upon the laymen the same high standards enforced among members of the
bar. For that matter, no accountant is subject to discipline for adver-
4 See Exhibit Four appended to statement of W. McNeil Kennedy, representing
the Chicago Bar Association, on H. R. 3214, made before the Senate Judiciary
Committee. That measure, as originally introduced, represented the considered
opinion of experts and had the approval of many bar associations. Among other
things, it was designed to make the Tax Court, now an administrative body, into
a court of the United States. On July 7, 1947, with debate limited, Section 2560
thereof was amended to read: "No qualified person shall be denied admission to
practice before such Court because of his failure to be a member of any profession
or calling." Necessarily, as amended, the bill was then opposed by the bar associa-
tions because it would operate to admit laymen to practice before a court in
violation of a principle, firmly rooted in law, that only lawyers shall represent
others in courts of record: Osborn v. United States Bank, 9 Wheat. 738, 6 L. Ed.
204 (1824), Robb v. Smith, 4 Ill. 46 (1841). The sponsors of the amendment refused
to concede this principle so the Senate, in order to insure passage of the bill as a
whole, struck out all provisions designed to convert the Tax Court into a judicial
body. It remains, therefore, an administrative agency. It is probable, however, that
its method of operation will have to be changed to meet the requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act, in accordance with the decision in Lincoln Electric
Co. v. Commissioner, 162 F. (2d) 379 (1947), unless change is made in the law.
5 Walker v. Kahn, 31 Pa. D. & C. 620 (1938).
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tising or soliciting employment, while members of the bar are prohibited
from both of these practices.
In still other important respects, the law treats lawyers differently than
accountants. The client, when consulting a lawyer, is generally protected
in his right to make free disclosure by treating his communications to his
lawyer as privileged.6 Except as provided by statute,7 communications to
accountants are not so privileged. The security of the confidential rela-
tionship, found between attorney and client, may often be an important
element in consultations over tax matters; its absence, when the ac-
countant is called upon, may be productive of mischief. By and large,
the lawyer's main duty is to advocate his client's cause. The predominant
characteristic of a certified public accountant, on the other hand is his
independence or objectivity. Advocacy and objectivity are diametric
opposites. For these reasons, then, to allow laymen accountants to engage
in formulating abstract interpretations of laws would open the door to the
same irresponsibility that has jeopardized public welfare by other forms
of unauthorized practice. 8
6 The history of privileged communications between attorney and client is almost
as ancient as the legal profession: Wigmore, Evidence, 3d Ed., Vol. 8, § 2290.
'Statutes on the subject may be found in Colo. Stats. 1929, Ch. 185, p. 642, Ga.
Stats. 1943, Tit. 84. § 84-216, Ill. Rev. Stats. 1947, Ch. 110Y!, § 19, Iowa Code 1931,
§ 1905-c-17, Ky. Stats. 1946, Ch. 210, § 20, and N. M. Stats. 1941, § 20-112(e), Others
may be in the course of promulgation: Wigmore, op. cit., § 2286, n. 14.
8 The following cases illustrate other acts held to amount to unauthorized practice
of law: People v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N. E. (2d) 693 (1948), conduct of litiga-
tion by disbarred attorney; People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Goodman,
366 Ill. 346, 8 N. E. (2d) 941, 111 A. L. R. 1 (1937), appearance of layman before
Industrial Commission; People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Chicago Motor
Club, 362 111. 50, 199 N. E. 1 (1935), legal services capitalized for profit; People
ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. The Motorists Association of Illinois, 354 Ill. 595,
188 N. E. 827 (1933), association rendering legal service to members; People ex rel.
Courtney v. Association of Real Estate Taxpayers, 354 Ill. 102, 187 N. D. 823 (1933),
lay intermediary between lawyers and their clients; People v. Schreiber, 250 IlL
345, 95 N. E. 189 (1911), fraudulent misrepresentation as to license to practice:
People v. Securities Discount Corporation, 361 Ill. 551, 198 N. E. 681 (1935), col-
lection agency practicing law; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Association v. Stock
Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N. E. 901 (1931), corporation practicing law;
Smith v. Illinois Adjustment Finance Co., 326 Ill. App. 654, 63 N. B. (2d) 264
(1945), same; Chicago Bar Association v. United Taxpayers of America, 312 Ill.
App. 243, 38 N. E. (2d) 349 (1941), certified public accountant and corporation
practicing before Department of Finance; Midland Credit Adjustment Co. v.
Donnelly, 219 II. App. 271 (1920), collection agency practicing law; Bump v.
District Court, 323 Iowa 623, 5 N. W. (2d) 914 (1942), layman presenting tax
refund claims; N. Y. County Lawyers Ass'n v. Dawkins, 262 App. Div. 56. 27
N. Y. S. (2d) 797 (1941), affirmed in 289 N. Y. 553, 43 N. E. (2d) 530 (1942),
appearance before Board of Assessors; People ex rel. Trojan Realty Co. v. Purdy,
174 App. Div. 702, 162 N. Y. S. 56 (1916), presentation of tax protests; In re
Standard Tax & Management Corp., 181 Misc. 632, 43 N. Y. S. (2d) 479 (1943),
giving of tax law advice; Mandelbaum v. Gilbert & Barker Mfg. Co., 160 Misc. 656,
290 N. Y. S. 462 (1936), accountant securing sales tax refunds; Crawford v.
McConnell, 173 Okla. 520, 49 P. (2d) 551 (1935), tax protests and refund claims:
Blair v. Motor Carriers Service Bureau, Inc.. 40 Pa. D. & C. 413 (1939), utility and
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Argument in favor of eradicating the distinction between the lawyer's
and the accountant's function in the tax field 9 has been based upon the
fact that accountants are admitted to practice before the Treasury De-
partment and the Tax Court. There is no valid foundation for this
argument. The Treasury Department rules expressly prohibit account-
ants enrolled with it from practicing law,10 and the Tax Court has per-
mitted very few laymen to be admitted before it. Since January 1, 1943,
non-lawyers have been admitted by it only upon examination. In one
five-year period, ninety-two non-lawyers took the examination but only
seven passed, of whom five were certified public accountants. Up until
recently, not one of the seven has tried a case in the Tax Court," and
an analysis of the decisions thereof in the same five-year period shows
that out of 3661 cases decided only 166, or 4.5%, were handled by non-
lawyer certified public accountants who had been admitted prior to the
examination requirement. 12 Statistics such as these speak for themselves.
It cannot be denied that tax laws and tax regulations today are so
tightly bound up with interpretations of the courts that legal concepts
necessarily become the basis upon which accountants outline the facts
with which they must work. It is unavoidable that an accountant, when
performing his accounting duties, must attempt to understand and follow
the provisions of the law. In this process, he uses his knowledge of the
law, perhaps even interprets it, for his own purposes in the performance
of his accounting duties, but he does so merely as an incident to his
primary hiring as an accountant. What he gets paid for, what he sells
to the public, however, is not legal advice but an accounting product the
legal sufficiency of which has not been tested and may never need be. The
scope of accounting practice is well understood 13 and the province of the
certified public accountant is well defined.1 4 When an accountant in-
interstate commerce consultants: Walker v. Kahn. 31 Pa. D. & C. 620 (1938).
insurance agent executing bonds and applications for license. But see State ex rel.
Johnson v. Childe. 147 Neb. 527. 23 N. W. (2d) 720 (1946). noted in 25 CHICAGO-
KENT LAw Rvitw 238. appearance before state commerce commission.
9 See nisi prins opinion in the instant case. 69 N. Y. S. (2d) 730 at 741, and also
78 N. Y. S. (2d) 209 at 218. Compare with discussions between groups of account-
ants and lawyers seeking to reach harmony on the point to be found in 63 Am. Bar
Rep. 325, 69 Am. Bar Rep. 189. 263, 264. and 469. 70 Am. Bar Rep. 267. and 32 Am.
Bar Ass'n Journ. 5. There is indication in 34 Am. Bar Ass'n Journ. 519 that the
instant case was in the nature of a "test" proceeding.
10 Treas. Dept. Circular 230, § 10.2(f).
11 See statement of V. McNeil Kennedy referred to in note 4, ante.
12 Ibid., Exhibit One.
13 An analysis thereof may be found in Blair v. Motor Carriers Service Bureau,
Inc., 40 Pa. D. & C. 413 at 431 (1939), and in Bump v. District Court, 232 Iowa 623.
5 N. W. (2d) 914 (1942).
14 See definitions in Ill. Rev. Stats. 1947, Ch. 11012 , § 7, and New York, State
Education Law. Art. 57. 1489(6). See also Am. Inst. of Accountants, Accounting
Research Bulletin No. 9.
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terprets the law for his own use in connection with these limited fields,
time-honored forms and formulas will tend to be a check upon his interpre-
tations. But interpretation of the law by accountants, apart from prepara-
tion of financial statements or when needed in the process of auditing books,
falls clearly beyond the realm of accounting practice.
Insofar as the preparation of income tax returns is concerned, some
courts have indicated that the preparation of anything but the simplest
of returns amounts to practicing law.15 The view expressed in the instant
case is that the accountant should be allowed maximum freedom of action
within the field of "tax accounting" to the end that a taxpayer be not
required to go to a lawyer to have his tax return prepared. 16 Somewhere
between these extremes, the line of demarcation will eventually be drawn.1
7
In the meantime, when an accountant comes face to face with a difficult
tax law problem in his legitimate practice, one which he recognizes re-
quires interpretation hence calls for legal research and an analysis of
court decisions, he should not hazard a guess at the solution but should
guarantee to his client the best possible solution by recommending that he
consult legal counsel.
With respect to drawing that line of demarcation, it should be re-
membered that a Pennsylvania court once said, "It is obvious that no
wall can be built around the field of the law that will keep all lawyers
within it and all laymen outside it."18 Likening the situation to an old
English case where a railroad's fence was defective and defendant's pigs
strayed and did damage to a trolley car,19 that court also quoted from the
learned Baron Bramwell's remarks therein as follows: "Nor do we lay
down that there must be a fence so close and strong that no pig could
push through it, or so high that no horse or bullock could leap it. One
could scarcely tell the limits of such a requirement, for the strength of
swine is such that they would break through almost any fence, if there
were a sufficient inducement on the other side... [It is] bound to put up
such a fence that a pig not of a peculiarly wandering disposition, nor under
any excessive temptation, will not get through it. ''20 Putting it differently,
15 Merrick v. American Security & Trust Co.. 107 F. (2d) 271. 71 App. D. C. 72.
cert. den. 308 U. S. 625. 60 S. Ct. 380. 84 L. Ed. 521 (1940) ; Lowell Bar Ass'n v.
Loeb, 315 Mass. 176. 52 N. E. (2d) 27 (1943). See also note in 42 Mich. L. Rev.
1122. and the issues of Unauthorized Practice News, particularly Vol. X, No. 2 and
No. 4, and Vol. XII, No. 1.
16 See 78 N. Y. S. (2d) 209 at 220.
17 The amicable discussions between accountants and lawyers referred to in note
9. ante, should some day lead to an acceptable compromise.
1s Blair v. Motor Carriers Service Bureau. Inc., 40 Pa. D. & C. 413 at 421 (1939).
19 The court referred to Child v. Hearn. 9 L. R. Ex. 176 (1874).
20 9 L. R. Ex. 176 at 181.
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the doctrine of the instant case should be applied sensibly2' to avoid any
imputation that the legal profession seeks to establish a monopoly.
Lawyers are not artisans joined into a trade union acting to serve only
their own selfish ends. In fact, the term "monopoly" has no place in the
vocabulary of the learned professions. It does not apply to those who
are bound to their calling by a vow; it belongs in the jargon of the
market-place. Lawyers are not, nay cannot be, in the market-place so the
problem as to what shall constitute the practice of law is not to be solved
by the competition of the market-place. Truly, in the public interest,
22
it is up to the courts to solve that problem. The instant case supplies a
proper solution to at least one aspect theieof.
GRACE THOMAS STRIPLING
21 It has been followed, with approval, by the highest court in New Jersey:
Auerbacher v. Wood. - N. J. Eq. -, 59 A. (2d) 863 (1948), affirming 139 N. J. Eq.
599, 53 A. (2d) 800 (1947).
22 In 28 Iowa I.. Rev. 116, at 117, appears the statement: "No person of intelli-
gence supposes that the organized medical profession makes war on quacks in order
to get more business for reputable doctors. If that were its real purpose, the better
professional strategy would be to let the quacks go ahead, since their practice
would inevitably increase both the number of patients for legitimate physicians
and the seriousness of their ailments. The same thought is true in the problem of
the unauthorized practice of law. The reports are full of cases which never would
have arisen had an attorney been employed at the start." The fight against un-
authorized practice of law is, most often, conducted by unselfish and uncompensated
groups acting solely in the public Interest.
